Affray - Subsmash Commentary
Commentary by Peter D Hulme on the book by Alan Gallop
Published 2007 by Sutton Publishing.
An extensive Affray discussion on this site led me to get hold of a copy of Alan Gallop's book SUBSMASH concerning the loss of the submarine Affray in 1951. Now I have a copy and after a first read I decided to read it again with notes about things that caught my attention and post them on the forum. This seemed like a good idea at the time but the notes got longer and longer requiring some serious checking.
Ideally the commentary should be read in conjunction with the book as I have endeavoured to present my comments on a chapter by chapter basis. If this makes the notes long and repetitive I apologise but even one line in the book can bring forth a lengthy pedantic response. One has to give the author the respect of explaining why one takes issue with things he says and quotes in this quite readable book that I think will be of interest to submariners old and new. However while a nice well organised flow has not been possible, I have attempted to make the text of interest and worthwhile reading for those without a copy of the book to hand.
These are entirely my own views based on the experiences as a young man serving in the electrical branch on Amphion Class submarines like Affray coupled with a keen interest in submarines of the era in late retirement. Without the aid of Lambert and Hill's excellent book The Sudmarine Alliance I could not possibly have recalled all the detail of an Amphion Class submarine nearly 60 years later, but on the whole my memory is pretty good though stated in terms of my own view of the whole submarine experience. I am sure others who served in these submarines will have other views, not the least because folks are all different but also that particular duties may well colour their memories. It would be greatly appreciated if I could be notified of any errors I may have made or wrong impressions given about submarines that I may have in good faith, unintentionally created.
I served on the Artemis for 12 months in 1950/1951 and we were in company with Affray during the ships visits mentioned in the book. Our First Lieutenant for most of 1950, William Kirkood, was lost as the Training Instructor on the Affray and I was in Dolphin Spare Crew for few days around the date she was lost. Later I went on to be the PO Electrician of Amphion. The Engineer Officer of Artemis gave evidence about the Amphion Class submarines to the Board of Inquiry. So I think it can be fairly said I have reason to have more than a passing interest in a book about this submarine disaster of so long ago.
Particularly a book that clearly does not want the matter to be left to rest, but wants to apportion blame by inference and disturb the last resting place of these men in the pursuit of finding the reasons for the disaster and of course that is his privilege as it is mine to offer an alternative view. The irony is that I could not have prepared these notes without the considerable research put into the book by the author, Alan Gallop. Very much a case of action bringing reaction.
The relatives and the author are not the only ones who would like this mystery solved and I am sure so would the many who served at the time or later, on the sister ships of the Affray, but I don't want to know at the cost of bringing indignity to the remains of these men have no doubt that others with better technical qualifications and easy access to the archives would be able to more comprehensively review the loss of the Affray , but this is simply a commentary by a former submariner of the time on a recently published book about the loss.
Peter D Hulme 2009.
FOREWORD
Affray
Here the book sets out that the author's aim to seek the truth about the loss of the Affray.
The Author's Boy 'Sailor' friend being a sentry on the Portsmouth Dockyard gates was a surprise. I wouldn't have thought a lad of about 15 would be placed in this position, but there you are, there is no doubt an explanation. When I was passing through the gates on a daily basis in 1953, the Dockyard Police were in charge.
I also thought the centre of operations was at HMS Dolphin usually entered from the public street via HMS Vernon.
As for the Boy 'Sailor' telling the author about an RN officer 'taking' the Dockyard Gate records, is a conspiracy being suggested? What was there to conspire about - we are never told.
The Dock Yard Police are of some significance in relation to my comments in relation to Chapter 3, about sabotage.
It is at the end of the foreword that the first mention of submarine trim briefly appears and to quote 'Which is, perhaps, why HMS Affray met the unfortunate end it did in the spring of 1951'. This theme is repeated without any satisfactory development and does not appear in the final chapter summarising the author's outstanding concerns.
I don't know whether or not there are archived records that Amphion Class hydroplanes could occasionally jam, but a search might be revealing. Losing trim rather badly with steep angles forward or aft was certainly not an everyday incident on the Amphion Class but in my experience, it happened three times that I can still remember well.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The acknowledgements are quite impressive with some well known names, not the least the excellent staff of the RNSM at Gosport.
CHAPTER 1
1951: POST WAR BLUES, RADIO TIMES.
Difficult to see the relevance of the content of this chapter mainly about civilian post war Britain other than to introduce the film 'Morning Departure' with a mention of the loss of the Truculent. In this chapter it would been valuable to read somebody like Eric Groves and then outline the financial restrictions that were being placed on the Navy at that time when quite quickly after winning a major war and placing many ships in reserve or scrapping them, the threat of the Red Navy appeared.
Large sums had to be spent on research to benefit from the many lessons learnt in the war, with equipment designed hurriedly on an empirical basis, needing a firm scientific base to move forward, particularly in the field of Anti-Submarine Warfare. The military politics of the atom bomb delivery are well known.
CHAPTER 2
THE SILENT SERVICE AND HIS MAJESTY'S SUBMARINE AFFRAY.
A potted history of submarines in the RN with various items of submarine trivia that might well be of interest to a reader unfamiliar with submarines.
On page 11 the usual myth about 'hot bunking' is trotted out, not a practical system for a boat designed for reasonable crew comfort on long patrols. And the author knows all this as he tells us on page 11 that the Amphion Class were designed for tropical climates.
As warships in general go, the A Class were roomy and reasonably habitable with little cause for claustrophobia. Looking back, the lower decks on a KVG battleship were in my opinion far more crowded and uncomfortable with no daylight. Like all smaller ships, comfort quickly disappears in bad weather, submarines sometimes had the option of diving for a while to prepare and eat meal. The author's quoting Edward Young later in the book confirms the surprising air of spaciousness and rough comfort, and Young was referring to a submarine smaller than the Affray. The growing number of long trips into Northern Waters with much time spent in transit on the surface in very bad weather was very debilitating for everybody and frankly I had had enough of it by the time I left the service. See Page 132, Lt Temple Richard's evidence to the Inquiry.
Later in the Cold War, I am advised the more modern boats snorted from the UK to wherever they were going without ever surfacing. I would imagine this would bring its own unique stresses.
Here are my comments about some of the 'domestic' items in this chapter, while trivial in regard to the disaster they are included in the book and correction based on experience is called for, giving I hope, clearer picture of the 'domestic' life aboard a submarine to non-submariner readers.
When at sea, I don't recall ever eating other than at the mess table either in the Seaman's mess or later the Chief's and PO's mess.
Neither did we queue for meals - it was the standard RN mess system with a single galley. Duty mess men from the seaman and stokers messes collected the food in trays to be served in the messes, with a permanent mess man recruited from the ranks of the stokers and seamen to the ERAs and Chief & POs respectively. The wardroom had a qualified steward. Tea was made by the messes themselves using the readily available water heater with a valued tea and sugar allocation stored in an aluminium box, one for each mess. I know little of the ERA's mess man, but as I recall the Chief and POs mess man was also the Coxswain's assistant with stores and the like, usually an AB known as the 'Tanky', he kept no watches.
I never had a ditty box or recall ever seeing one in the Navy. In the accommodation space there was nowhere so many could be stowed. On the face it they would be a menace, loose hanging around. I had one of the seat lockers available for kit etc. We all brought along a best No1 uniform for going ashore. But I am happy to be corrected about ditty boxes, hardly a matter of great importance.
The description of the rum issue is incorrect, Grog (rum and water) was issued to each individual rating leading hand and neat rum to Chiefs and POs. One could be classified as G for Grog, T for temperance in which case one received sixpence a day in lieu of and UA (under 20) and not entitled. The Coxswain held the rum in his store and officers did not get rum issued. They purchased duty free liquor like gin. On the whole the tot didn't seem to create any problems and was something to look forward to each day on long trips, though I was temperance simply to get the sixpence, pay was not that high and accumulated sixpences helped while on leave.
In regard to adequate manning I think the problem for the author and others is that they fail to fully appreciate that other than at diving stations, the submarine operated on a three watch system with for instance, only six people in the engine room/motor room compartment. The watch ERA and one leading stoker on the engine control platform, two stokers near the mid engine exhaust valves, plus the Electrician's Mate in the Motor Room, with one stoker in the after auxiliary machine space looking after the shaft glands and steering gear normal and emergency. There might an extra person permanently aboard for training. This was the set-up for surface, submerged on battery or snorting. The EO, CERA and the PO Electrician would have kept a supervisory eye on things, but not 24 hours a day. All pretty relaxed as far as I was concerned.
Of course snorting in rough weather could be busy if we kept pulling a vacuum that forced the OOW or the ERA on watch to stop the engines. I always got the impression holding the trim in the control room was pretty tiring work requiring good plane operators and an experienced OOW. In addition to controlling the boat, a periscope watch was kept. On occasions in daylight I saw both periscopes in use watching for aircraft with the OOW focused on the trim. A radar watch was also kept though I know nothing of the detail Sometimes the boat would go to diving stations for starting to snort, but not often in my experience. We occasionally dived and surfaced on the watch if the weather was reasonable. More on snorting later re' the exercise.
The most informative items in this chapter involve a brief description of the early service of the Affray. There is a reference to the battery (3rd September 1946) apparently defective only a few months after being fitted. In over six years in Amphion Class and T Class boats I never experienced a completely failed cell let alone a whole battery. Why did this vital item have to be replaced and which battery, No1 or No 2? Was it relevant to the later battery tank problems? We are not told in the book. Readers will find the subject of the battery and battery tanks raised several times with no attempt to explain the full technical ramifications. More commentary on this important item later.
I had thought the Amphion Class boats including Affray were mainly based in Hong Kong with the Adamant in 1946 as part of Britain's post war naval policy, but apparently not? However this is of no importance in investigating the loss of the Affray, except perhaps, I have always understood snort kits sent out from the UK were fitted to some Amphion Class in Hong Kong dockyard that at the time enjoyed a good reputation. The author finishes with a paragraph that starts - 'Snort masts were regarded as a wonderful invention, but in 1951 they had some serious flaws that needed to be ironed out'.
When discussing flaws in the snort masts its as well to recall the RN submarine fleet had snorted tens of thousands of miles prior to the loss of the Affray, including the Tropical cruise of the 1947 Alliance and in 1948 the Ambush to the Arctic. Both cruises for the specific purpose evaluating snorting in various arduous conditions. Reported on in full in the archives and partially in the Alliance book. The Amphion snort system in 1953 following a full refit didn't seem any different to the Artemis in 1950. Or were the Admiralty not telling us something and today, neither is the author! He goes on. The need to thoroughly train crews about the correct usage of snort was paramount in the submarine service.
And another gem, used incorrectly by a busy or inexperienced crew in the engine room could quickly send a submarine to the bottom of the sea'. Well that hasn't happened in the period from 1946 to the date when the last of the Upholder Class were mothballed, and diesel boats were no more in the RN. Neither did it happen in the large USN snorkel fleet, with a basically similar but actually a little more complicated kit than the RN set-up. This is a testament to the care and attention of the many people involved over the decades in an operation that requires a continuing state of alertness while on watch.
Actually the Arctic cruise did reveal that the snort head valve could freeze open and the boat would need to go deeper to melt the ice. Snorting became impractical in these circumstances. But note the need to be alert and keep a hand near the hull induction valve. Very soon an electrically heated snort head valve assembly was progressively fitted to all Amphion Class though not to the Affray nor Amphion in the 1953 refit. Clearly the author is setting the stage for what is to come in later chapters, but offers no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise.
It is worth mentioning at this point that the Affray on her last trip carried a full complement of engine room and motor room staff, sufficient to run the normal three watches. The Electrician's Mate put ashore, Page 36 was additional to the usual submarine basic complement of the Electrician (A Petty Officer), a Leading Electrician's Mate and two Electrician's Mates 1st Class.
CHAPTER 3
DAD I THINK THIS BOAT IS JUST ABOUT FINISHED
This chapter opens with 'the Affray having entered the HM Dockyard, Portsmouth for a major refit on 8 May 1950'. But in Chapter 2 we are told - 'June 1950 found her in the Norwegian ports of Galesund (Alesund), Bergen and, Haugusend before returning to Manchester on 7th July'. All 'show the flag' visits with the Artemis on which I was serving at the time. From these dates it would appear her dockyard stay would be too short for a major stripping of the submarines machinery for refurbishment as detailed in my commentary later in this chapter in regard to Amphion. At the close of this chapter the author states that Affray lost her 4 inch gun and 20 mm anti-aircraft weapon and received her own snort tube January 1950 - another period in dockyard? This date may well be correct but no later than 1948/48 would be a better fit, the usually reported progress dates for the fitting of snorts to all the A Class, some even being fitted as they were being completed in the yards. These were after all the 'front line' class in the Royal Navy's Submarine Fleet.
The author goes on to tells us that, 'Her crew was ready for Christmas leave, although some would return early to be present when the submarine was again booked into HM Dockyard, Portsmouth for a full engine refit starting I January 1951.' Here we lack definition of what the author means by a full engine refit, the complete removal and refurbishment of all the heavy cylinders/pistons or simply light maintenance work on such things as the fuel pumps, Fuel spray valves etc? Re' the crew returning early January 1st. The normal procedure was that half the crew went before Christmas returning before New Year's Eve to allow the other half to go in time to start their ten days leave in time to be home for New Year's Eve, the first half having enjoyed Christmas Eve and Day with their families.
According to an article 'Disaster Beneath the Waves', In January 1951 Affray was transferred to a Reserve Group 'G' at Portsmouth but on 17th March she was brought out of Reserve and Lt John Blackburn DSC was appointed CO with the task of bringing Affray and the new ship's company up to operational status. The 'task' was hardly onerous, Affray was only out of fleet service for about 60 days and from the book, Page 33, still had senior crew members attached including the First Lieutenant Sherwood (12 months on Affray ) and the Engineer Officer Alston (22 months on Affray ) and considered very capable men by their former captain, Lieutenant Temple-Richard. But I must say I have difficulty with this article as whole as it makes serious statements with no sources quoted. Who to believe?
I suspect the necessary Reserve Group management policies of the times have much to do with what have been unfairly depicted then and now, as cavalier actions by the submarine officers of the time who had all served through WWII. I have added an appendix RESERVE GROUPS, with the intention showing submarines in this groups were often maintained in full operational condition manned by a single experienced crew and only the status changed when a submarine was brought back into the fleet with its own crew. Note Board of Inquiry statement Page 114. More on refits later in this chapter.
In this chapter Engine Room Artificer Second Class, David Bennington comes into the book, his numerous letters to his father played a critical role in the aftermath of the loss. His statements and concerns that were eventually published in the press and were given serious consideration by the Board of Inquiry but largely refuted by the previous captain of the Affray and a fellow ERA during their giving of evidence. Frankly on reading the letter content published in the book, there didn't seem to anything that would justify sending letters that must have upset his father. We on Artemis were in company with Affray in 1950 on the same 'show the flag' trips mentioned in the book and things seemed OK when alongside each other, and no word of serious difficulties came to our notice and Jack was a great gossip
However it is a case of speaking ill of the dead and the boat was lost in mysterious circumstances tending to confirm Bennington's worst first fears, but I am afraid taking all that is in the book and my own experiences in a similar Amphion Class , I think he was rather exaggerating the situation aboard Affray prior to her refit during the 1950 period. Engine problems on submarines were not uncommon with memories of making my way to and from the motor room edging past ERA's and stokers with a complete cylinder dismantled. Aboard the Amphion the starboard engine blew up in a spectacular manner while snorting in 1953 filling the engine room full of thick black smoke forcing us to surface and into an early start for the intended refit at Portsmouth. I was on watch in the motor room fairly close to the action when this happened and very grateful to the keen ear of the CERA who started shutting down before the failure, minimizing the damage else we all may have been sprayed with engine bits and pieces. Readers will in the end, have to make their own evaluation of David Bennington's letters in the context of the book and the mores of the time.
Dave Lowe as a former Dockyard apprentice in 1950 presents a dockyard picture of ill-disciplined crews of RN submarine during time in the dockyard. In my experience there were two dockyard scenarios:
The first scenario is one I experienced during the long refit of Amphion in 1953. Accommodation and offices were in a dedicated building fairly close to the dock. The spares boxes for inspection were in a caged lock-up in larger building near the dock. The submarine was completely stripped and all machinery removed for refurbishment in the various specialist Dockyard workshops, a well planned operation. At the peak only the propulsion motors were left as they only needed an inspection and clean.
There was little if any friction between dockyard staff and the skeleton crew, there was little reason as the RN people took no part in the actual refit work, and it was much like the building of a new submarine. My duties as an Leading Electrician's Mate, the senior electrical rating left with the boat along with one EM 1st Class, was confined to stripping, checking and repacking the numerous electrical spares boxes. Obviously one was expected to keep an eye open and report concerns to the refit Lieutenant in charge. Also it was a time of learning about the boat as she was dismantled and reassembled, but on the whole a cushy number apart from evening duty watch when you had to clamber all over the stripped boat to make sure there were no fires etc. I was living ashore with my wife when not on duty.
The second dockyard scenario involved a relatively short docking for repairs or inspections with a full crew, this was not a common situation in my own experience but we did once spend two weeks in dock at Devonport for general hull maintenance. I managed to frequently escape and stay at the most excellent NAAFI hostel with my wife and our baby, so I really can't comment if there were any 'incidents' on that occasion, but the Jimmy and the senior chiefs didn't put up with too much bad behaviour in those days. In fact people in submarines at that time, were on the whole, well behaved and air of casual but firm discipline prevailed.
For what it is worth on Artemis in 1950 we went into the floating dock at Portland to paint the hull, no dockyard labour was involved. Not sure who operated the dock.
Regarding David Lowe's experience lowering the snort mast. Lowering the snort mast in harbour at any time without a safety clearance was a remarkably reckless thing to do as people were often working on the after casing where mooring ropes and springs were stowed.
On Page 24 the author states that the Affray went into the dockyard for an engine refit starting 1 January 1951and it is clear to me from the detail in the book that this second dockyard scenario is the one that was experienced by Affray in 1951. This view is confirmed in particular by the book on Page 23 stating that ERA Bennington was still at work in the engine room and concerned about his health as he wrote to his father 5th February 1951. It is also clear that there was a duty watch PO in the form of Electrical Artificer Duncombe who joined the Affray 6th April. LEM Wood was carrying out his duties aboard and discusses the oily water in the battery sump with Leading Seaman Goddard while in the mess with four other duty ratings. Duncombe, a skilled electrical tradesman states in the book at this time 'We had one or two teething problems at first, but the main one was the No 1 Battery tank.' Not exactly a submarine in poor condition!
Thus there is no indication that Affray actually went out of commission and that the crew had completely moved out of the boat to clear the way for the Dockyard to take over as had been the case with the Amphion. As mentioned earlier, a source other than the book states she was in Reserve Group status at this time and the off-duty crew could well have been living in the submarine crew accommodation at Dolphin.
I suggest it had been expected that she would be out well before she actually did with plenty of time to run up prior to the planned April Exercise, but she lingered until there was no time for a comfortable running up period before the date of the exercise loomed. However the need for extensive sea trials and running up periods were simply not required as apparently there were no major repairs to equipment requiring extensive diving trials. The Affray had not gone through a major refit as I have described for Amphion that recommissioned with a new crew, especially senior officers and NCOs.
Why she lingered in the Dockyard is not clear, but it was not due to extensive work being carried and running over time, in fact the author states the log books confirm that repair and maintenance work was indeed taking far too long. Log book entries for most of March of 1951 show practically no repairs were completed although there were numerous entries stating cleaning had taken place. Is this the authors interpretation of the logs or are concerns expressed by the responsible officers of the Affray.
We are told of a series of meetings ashore with absolutely no information about who attended and what discussed and decisions made. We are told the crew were worked long hours to repair the faulty engine and plus scores of other tasks. One would have taken from this that the dockyard staff had done nothing of substance from January to March. Did the Submarine's First Lieutenant and the Engineering Officer sit mute while nothing happened? Well the First Lieutenant did express his concerns to his wife, that the ship was not seaworthy. But not apparently to the new Captain who seems unconcerned from the time he joined in March.
David Lowe suggests a piecemeal approach to repairs where work was requested from the Dockyard and later booked to the ship. Makes sense to me, how else is the cost of ship repair to be accounted for? Calling on his own experiences, apparently as an apprentice, he suggests the Navy preferred a half-finished job or tried to do it themselves. He was it seems not involved with Affray and therefore describing the general RN Dockyard scene that if we are to take his remarks at face value the Navy was run by a bunch of lazy, ineffectual incompetents.
Well certainly we did things for ourselves or got the well-equipped submarine depot ship to assist where special machinery was required, that's what it was they were there for! But we weren't incompetent idiots and knew when a task required skills or facilities beyond our own. I tramped round Bristol once until I found a ship supplier who could supply a few metres of heavy lead covered cable to replace a damaged length on the main ballast pump, getting it from Dolphin was not practical, no couriers in those days.
Our ERAs were excellent and could tackle any mechanical repair that it was practical to make on a submarine at sea. SomehowAffray's lot are made out to be a bunch of winging buffoons who happily allowed their boat to fall into disrepair or allow the dockyard to not properly carry out docketed repairs. I need a lot more proof than has been presented in the book to accept crew incompetence and unless all the documents are available we must assume the Affray was in good order in the eyes of her Engineer Officer and Captain and in my experience no CERA would keep his mouth shut if things weren't right. All the CERA in my experience were very impressive men who any captain would listen to if concerns were expressed. However I must concede the First Lieutenants comments to his wife are disturbing and not what I would have expected when I was in submarines. Not so much for accuracy but in that he said them at all. On the face of it, he was not a man worn out as might be the case of wartime patrols but someone who had it relatively easy for months. Not reliable for a long patrol is one thing but unseaworthy is quite another.
In the book we are left with no idea why the Affray spent so much time in the Dockyard (but not necessarily Dockyard hands) and then apparently departed with little remedial work completed and as the First Lieutenant told his wife, unseaworthy. Apart from the oil/water in the No1 battery sump, we are given no idea what was supposed to be wrong with this submarine apart from a broad-brush comment about the engines with no detail whatsoever. It could a dodgy fuel pump or a main bearing problem, no idea!
Sabotage was an issue, but not overly so in that Amphion's large ballast pump having been removed and refurbished was left overnight on the casing waiting to be lowered into the engine room, next morning it was found to have been pushed into the bottom the dry dock. Up and till then we didn't have a full time sentry, after all we were supposed to be in a secure Naval Dockyard. Later as the full crew settled in the newly refitted boat alongside Dolphin the main hull air induction valve had to be stripped by our engine room crew for some minor reason and unexpected evidence was found of what was thought to be sabotage, though I know little about it as it was, all hush-hush with a couple of men in dark suits peering up the valve hole with the EO and CERA, well that's as much as I recall standing at a distance in the motor room except the mess deck chat was that a linen bag of bolts had been placed on the induction pipe spider and was intended to rot allowing the bolts to fall into the valve faces As might be expected, I was not taken into the confidence of those involved so my observations were from a distance as it were but it was a very long time ago and I can't even prove its not all in my imagination, but I don't think so. These were strange times with many people still strong Soviet supporters dismayed at the Cold War but that's another story.
Looking at the refit from my level, it all seemed to go OK. We commissioned and went into fleet service with no major failures that I can recall. I was promoted to be the boats PO Electrician while still in the Dockyard, it was simply my time on the General Service RN promotion list. Normally a PO Electrician would have been drafted in and I would have continued as the LEM. Perhaps, and I do not really know, crew shortages may well have forced the Submarine Drafting Office to take people on submarines temporarily out of action but not out of commission, away to fill gaps on active submarines. Something that did not seem happen later as the total complement grew to meet the need.
We have others in this chapter making statements about the condition of Affray in 1950 that are largely refuted by witnesses at the Inquiry. One is of particular interest, a leaking hydraulic ram in the engine that the Leading Stoker Mechanic Day experienced and thought was the cause of the snort induction valve operating slowly. He may well have been right, but viewed from a simple technical perspective; this is an unlikely scenario with the telemotor (hydraulic) pressure in the order of 1200 to 1500 lbs per square inch. However there may be more to his story than is reported in the book. Of most significance is that he confirms the main induction valve was hydraulically operated in 1950 and hence valves were not a remedial addition after the disaster as stated later Page 178.
Leading Stoker Day's job in the engine room is stated to be raising and lowering the raise, lower, open and close the snort mast's induction tube. This can't be correct, the snort mast or induction tube was raised and lowered from the control room. The hull induction valve was opened and shut in the engine room.
The basics of the career of the 1951 captain, Blackburn are detailed, a decorated WWII skipper with considerable experience in command and as a First Lieutenant. Note I am advised by John Eade, submarine historian and researcher of the times, that Blackburn is listed as a Lieutenant dated 01/07/1943, (promotion to Lieutenant Commander needed 8 years as a Lt). The author refers to Blackburn throughout the book using both ranks. At that time commanders of Amphion Class submarines were Lieutenants or Lieutenant Commanders.
Captain Coote had this to say in his book 'Submariner', that I must say I thought it was rather unkind and I found most unsatisfactory his not giving the name of the Skipper and his boat, who Coote says refused this exercise, while making a disparaging comment about the deceased Blackburn. Clearly this unnamed officer should have been a principle witness giving evidence to the Board of Inquiry. Why did he not come forward as a matter of duty?
A group photograph of Blackburn as a young Sub Lieutenant on the submarine HMS Safari commanded by the famous Commander Ben Bryant. This impressive group don't look as though they would tolerate someone who wasn't up to scratch fighting a war!
Chapter 15, PERISHER AND THE PERISHER AND FIRST COMMANDThere were only two others on my Submarine Commanding Officers Qualifying Course to give the Perisher its proper title. John Blackburn, who had great potential, was to lose his life in his second command, HMS Affray, which down with her not only her ships' company but an entire training-class of submarine engineer officers, many sons of serving officers. She had just come out of an extended time in dockyard hands when she was abruptly ordered to sea, straight into the potentially dangerous procedure of snorting by night in a main shipping lane. It was not in John's nature to question his orders. No matter what misgivings he may have felt. Another Commanding Officer in a boat in a similar state of readiness flatly refused to sail on the exercise which led to the untimely end of the Affray and her fine company. Significantly no disciplinary action was taken against him, and he was promoted to Commander. Affray lies in 250 feet of water next to the Hurd Deep, fifteen miles north-west of Alderney Harbour.
In this chapter is introduced an issue that in my view is the most significant in regards to the submarines fitness for service, the oil and water mix found in the number No1 battery sump by the EA Duncombe while duty PO. Significant in that we have so little else of substance that might sensibly give a clue as to the cause of the disaster. Indeed it is the only specifically detailed item that indicates something not right.
It should be explained that in commission, in harbour there was a duty watch, with a duty officer and duty PO. An Electricians Mate was always included for charging or even operating the motors while in the trot (group of submarines alongside) if the boat was required to be moved to say allow another submarine to go to sea. This is important in than later in the book the duty LEM also found water in the No 1 battery sump Page 127. It is not clear if they are really the same event misreported. The roster of Chiefs and PO who carried out the duties of PO of the watch included the EA, PO Stoker, and other Chiefs and POs with specific exceptions. At sea the same roster performed the duties of PO of the watch in the Control Room, surfaced or submerged. An important duty.
In the book the problems with the No 1 battery are dealt with in a most unsatisfactory manner with sources largely coming from unqualified ratings not directly involved in the matter. If oil/water was leaking into the sealed tank then this was in my view, a most serious matter with the cause having to be urgently determined and the problem remedied to the satisfaction of the highest level of structural engineering authority, both civil and naval. Only in chapter 26 page 177, does Commander Tall RN, being interviewed by the author, tersely state 'the water/oil issue was sorted out', how did he know? I don't think he was even in the Navy at that time, let alone involved with Affray. Had he seen archived documents not published in the book? He was Director of the RN Submarine Museum.
The No1 Battery Tank, from text in the book Alliance by Lambert and Hill that confirms my experiences of many years ago.
The No 1 battery was in No 1 battery tank beneath the central part of the accommodation space, a clearance of about 10inch being left between the top of the cells and the deck of the accommodation space. Access to the tank was gained through rubber seated screw down battery boards. The tank was lined with Rosbonite to prevent corrosion of the ship's structure by acid. The 112 cells (each about 530 kg) stood on waxed teak gratings to which were secured rubber pads to prevent contact between the cells and the ships structure. The tank floor sloped aft to a sump which could be sighted in the Engineers store.
The battery boards that covered the cells and formed part of the accommodation space deck and were of a fabricated steel design, large, strong and heavy to lift as I well remember. Through them on a periodical basis the specific gravity of each cell could be measured and then topped up with distilled water. Removing a specific cell could require lifting out several others and moving other cells around to bring the faulty cell into a clear opening, though this never happened in my experience. Provisions were made to charge individual cells to bring them up to the overall average state of the battery. In a major refit the batteries were removed and replaced.
Two circular plates about 12 inches in diameter in the passage way, held down by three screws, provided access at the change of every watch to a 'pilot' cell to give an idea of the battery specific gravity, only one was in regular use. It was of course possible that these frequently used cover plates were the source of the ingress of fuel/water but there would surely have been signs on the top of the cell and most certainly this would be the first culprit to spring to mind for examination. It is worth considering that the RN had by this time, about 50 years experience of stowing cells on submarines and the benefit of reports of any shock problems due to depth charging in two wars. As I recall the cells were also wedged individually to keep them in place. The author's reference to ' held in place by asbestos string is a puzzle.
As the construction of the battery tank was rectangular in a circular pressure hull, significant spaces were left at the sides and beneath. The side spaces formed tanks for fresh water and battery distilled water for topping up cells. The space beneath was divided athwart ship to form No 3 (1795 gallons) and No 4 (1948 gallons) internal fuel tanks. The after bulkhead of the battery tank formed part of an accessible Engineers Store where the sight sump was located. Forward, the bulkhead formed part of the No1 (4465 gallons) and No 2 (4465 gallons) Internal fuel tanks divided by a longitudinal bulkhead. Thus the bulk of the battery tank itself was adjacent to fuel and water - logically the source of any fuel and water appearing in the battery tank through cracked or otherwise faulty welding. We have no information as how seriously the welded seams of the battery tank were examined and tested. More importantly were any leaks found and repaired, only second hand lower deck gossip from people with a limited knowledge of the submarines internal structures.
Some two years later the Chief Stoker of the Amphion told me that he never used internal tanks when snorting due the possibility of excessive sea pressure occurring because the fuel tanks were all pressurised by controlled exposure to the sea to compensate in the tank for used fuel with sea water and deliver the fuel to the engine room where any water was separated from the fuel by the De Laval centrifugal separators. He felt the boat only had to lose trim and the sea pressure would become excessive beyond the strength of the fuel tanks with the cells being contaminated with oily seawater if the tanks was more water than fuel, and the consequent risk of chlorine gas that would be picked up by the battery ventilation and out into the boat. The reality is we neither knew how much chlorine gas or its toxicity. But it was a theory that fits Commander Tall's three in a row failure scenario, Page 176. All this was a long time ago and was interesting but not vital knowledge for me as the boat's Electrician, but I think I have it clear what he said about one possible cause of the loss of the Affray. In recent years I have come across U-Boat Command orders banning the use of internal fuel tanks when snorkelling due to risk of over pressurising the tanks.
The chapter continues with the instructions to Blackburn to be ready for sea after a short trial.
My understanding from the time I was in submarines was that it was the First Lieutenant's duty to report to the Captain prior to sailing that the ship was ready for sea in all respects and apparently Foster did not strongly express his serious concerns to his Captain as he had done to wife. Or did he express them and Blackburn was quite happy to have a second in command with such grave misgivings that ignored, suggested the Captain was reckless? It was always my privilege to serve with First Lieutenants who were fine inspiring officers and managed the ship with firmness and confidence. From the ranks of these men came the submarine commanders of the future. Lt W Kirkwood the Instructor on Affray, our First Lieutenant on Artemis was one such officer.
The chapter concludes with the information that the submarine was officially declared fit for sea and that a reduced crew took her across to Dolphin. This seems rather outside what I believe was the usual custom of the captain and the complete crew joining the boat in the final testing and acceptance days before completion in the Dockyard, however if all the key officers and CPO/POs were present then this would be quite satisfactory. Apparently the First Lieutenant and the Engineering Officer from 1950 stayed with boat through the refit, both experienced officers in submarines and this boat in particular. See Chapter 5. There is no doubt my mind that I knew she did not have a full crew when alongside at Dolphin. I was in Spare Crew having left Artemis at Dolphin 14th April 1951 until drafted to join Truncheon at Rothesay 19th April 1951. I had heard she was going on ship visit to my home town, Manchester and thought about trying for a place on her but the drafting office had me down for, as I say, the Truncheon.
The book states that she did her first sea trial post re-fit, with half a crew on 11th April 1951. The half crew is not as big an issue as has been made out. As I commented earlier a submarine normally operates with a third of the crew on watch and this was just a short day trip. A lot depends on the people, for instance if the EO and the CERA were not present, that would quite surprising but if the half crew had the right mix there should have been no problem. And it cannot be repeated too often, the skipper Blackburn was an experienced submarine commander and perfectly capable of assessing his crew needs for any given situation, else he should not have been in a command position. And what was there to be gained career-wise in taking risks in this situation? And as the book makes clear all that he did was approved by Captain (S/M) at Dolphin and he had a staff who could express concern if they felt strongly enough about the plans for Affray. Not the least Commander (S/M) Edward Talbot Stanley. The second in command of the Flotilla, who in the book is only asked technical questions and expressed surprise to the Inquiry about leaving the EA behind but apparently didn't know prior to sailing or chose not to express any concerns to Blackburn or Captain (S/M).
CHAPTER 4
EXERCISE TRAINING SPRING
The author covers the first dive out of refit and the preparations for the fateful exercise. There were two crewing scenarios. The first was the crew assembled for the first test dive that according to the author was much reduced in numbers and had to have Reserve Group crew members added to bring the numbers up to 40 officers and men (crew members apparently taking the nominal Easter Leave Period). As previously stated this crew must have been seen as adequate by the experienced Skipper Blackburn for the test dive and the fact is the trials were carried out to his satisfaction without any problems, indeed the always concerned ERA Bennington reported to his father 'We have done our trials and everything went off pretty well and consequently everyone is pretty pleased'. Apparently the nature of the crew assembly for the trials did not disturb the experienced ERA Bennington who did not hesitate to tell his father about any concerns.
More on Reserve Groups later and in the Appendix
The statement that Leading Seaman Goddard had wired up the hatch containing the yellow indicator buoy should be clarified as this statement seems to imply the hatch was fixed and perhaps could not be released from inside a submerged, but damaged boat as intended. All boats coming out of major refit have a large portion of the crew who have only recently been drafted to join the much smaller number of crew member that stayed with the boat during refit. Certainly the majority of Officers, senior Chiefs and POs would in my experience join the boat as the refit was nearing completion. However this experience was two years after the loss of Affray but regardless the first dive(s) after refit is always going to be with a crew only recently assembled. More on this later.
The second crew scenario and the most critical were those assembled to take the Affray on the fateful exercise. Putting aside the issue of the officer trainees, the exercise would have been a comfortable trip for the captain to try out a boat fresh out of period inactive in dockyard and observe the abilities of the crew and who were all new to him but not on the whole to the First Lieutenant and Engineer Officer. An exercise that by the standards of the time was not onerous and intended to be only from Monday evening to the following Monday morning with an overnight break in Falmouth on the Thursday and at some point land the marines aboard in on some remote English beach.
However I am certainly no expert in the operational policies of the day but at the time one took some interest in what was going on, particularly if it effected the day to day activities of the boat and it does strike me as odd that the Affray was going to snort all night, well according to those who did not go to sea but heard Blackburn's address to the crew. But Captain S/Ms instructions Page 28 leave the method of night passage to Blackburn's judgement so it was his choice. My hazy recollections are that on the big realistic NATO exercises lasting several weeks, we snorted during the day using the periscope, hoping to spot approaching aircraft that had picked up our snort head on radar or visually. At night I understood we were a sitting radar duck and dived out of the way but I realise looking back those were the days when new tactics were being worked out and tried and Captain S/M didn't discuss them with me.
The aims of the Affray on this trip were surely shaped by the artificial need to expose the numerous trainees to all the basic aspects in small groups and not to conduct a 24/7 war operation where everybody is out to get you. I am inclined to agree with Captain Coots (quote attached above) that the busy English Channel was no place for a snorting submarine at night, but perhaps it wasn't as busy in 1951? All night periscope look out would have been very demanding. Collision was one of the very real risks in the peace time submarines, a risk then recently driven home by the 1950 loss of the Truculent. I never ever failed to realise the lookouts had our lives in their hands though I didn't lose any sleep about it. Its like all the other people one has to depend on in life who you don't even know. It is notable that many if not all submarines were later fit with the officially named sturdy Truculent navigation lights at the extreme bow and stern. However as we will later see there was no evidence of a collision involving the Affray. The contentious issue was the taking aboard for the exercise of two classes of officer trainees, with certain crew members left ashore. More on this later.
The author gives what appears to be a copy of Blackburn's orders from Captain (SM) copied and I think retyped from the original orders, the source is not referenced. However the detail makes it clear the Captain was not under any pressure to take any risks and largely had a free hand. The author and others seem to find the carrying and landing of a small party of Marines (Special Boat Squadron people one supposes) most unusual and even sinister. I doubt it; we took a similar party and launched their foldboats to land on the beach in the Scilly Isles. Next day we picked them up and we all enjoyed the Sunday newspapers they brought back with them. Just an exercise unless one wants to indulge in conspiracy theories.
Of more serious concern is the forward torpedo hatch that had to be opened to get the foldboats on the casing ready for the water. This hatch is quite low in the water as can seen on any drawings and is not usually opened at sea, in fact the hatch is clipped and heavy billets of steel put in place to strengthen the gap in the circular hull caused by the angled hatch, see LS Goddard's evidence Page 128. However I'm sure all precautions re' sea condition would be taken as there would not appear to be any urgency also one assumes it was to some degree a self-adjusting situation if the sea conditions were OK for the small foldboats then it was likely safe to open the hatch. We may have even changed the trim to bring the hatch higher, I don't recall, if I ever knew. See a brief reference to the risk Chap 10 Page 82, no further indication is given as to how much weight was given to this risk.
The author reports Marine Sergeant Andrews expressing concerns that the boat leaked like a sieve, how on earth did he know that? ERA Bennington, not an optimist by any means, had just expressed satisfaction with the state of the boat following the only dive prior to the exercise. Bennington sends more depressing reports to his poor father.
Footnote to Chapter 4 commentary.
- Extract from the appendix RESERVE GROUPS. Note the long period between working up the new submarine and the delayed working up patrol.
- 23rd November 1944 Sidon was completed and commenced trials followed by the start of working up training at the Holy Loch
- 20th January 1945 Damaged in a submerged collision with HMS/m Turpin. Her stem cutter was turned to starboard by a length of 4 feet.
- 8th-23rd September 1945 Sidon departed Lerwick to commence her working up patrol. This took place on the west coast of Norway on a known U-boat track.
CHAPTER 5
CLOAK AND DAGGER STUFF
The author makes a number of unsubstantiated statements about the abilities of the crew and apparently knows what they were thinking about. If I am to believe all their concerns, they were very different to the men I served with and this I very much doubt. Jack would grumble about anything, its when he went quiet that you had to get concerned.
We are also told how experienced were the Affray's First Lieutenant and Engineer Officer, both having been attached to Affray for 12 months or more. They stayed with the boat during the refit. Indeed the EO had apparently been with her for 21 months, quite a long time in the submarine service. This experienced and highly trained officer must have been very familiar with any problems his boat may have had and was in a position to clearly state any concerns direct to the captain. Lt Kirkwood, the training officer leading the group of trainee seaman or executive officers is stated to be an 'outstanding officer' and had spent the last year as the Principal Training Officer of Amphion Class submarines. Well he was certainly a competent officer, but he had actually been the First Lieutenant of the Artemis appointed 15/12/1949 and left 10-11-1950 to be the First Lieutenant of Dolphin Spare Crew. I served on Artemis from 21 February 1950 to 19th April 1951.
Kirkwood was a very nice man and he is on our crew photograph taken at Manchester summer 1950. Affray was there as well. I left Dolphin Spare Crew 19th April 1951 go to Truncheon at Rothesay, Scotland. T Class boats continued snorting. The image on the right is fom an original large glossy of mine showing Lt Kirkwood and Signalman Jeffs on Artemis bridge summer of 1950, note the length of the snort mast. It was secured by a yoke about 1 metre below the top of the bridge where the men are standing and broke of just above this point.
The author places great importance on the modern concept of team work etc, but this is a misunderstanding of the way things were in 1951. We were a crew, but very much separated by our fields of expertise. The stokers lived in a world of their own, as did the telegraphists; the electrical people lived in the seaman's mess and answered to the 1st Lt but performed their watch keeping duties in the motor room in the after part of the engine room. It was the stokers who shared their Kai with you in the middle of the night on watch, not the seaman watch keepers in the control room who quite reasonably simply forgot about you way back there. When snorting the various people on watch in the engine room formed a team, indeed the ERA and the Electricians Mate despite a significant difference in rating, had to be always in sync' with their hand signals. And in turn the 'on watch' stokers with the ERA assisted by the leading stoker. (Two engines) formed a team to start and shut down the engines. Yet the Electrician's Mate was effectively alone on watch when submerged on battery, with the ERA and stokers with little to do, spinning yarns at the other end of the engine room.
The art of ASDIC listening was limited to a few and at attack stations a number of people from different specialisations formed the skippers attack team in the Control Room. It is worth stating that in 1951 only fairly recently had the TAS branch been formed and combined the torpedo branch now without its electrical members who had moved into the new Electrical Branch, with the ASDIC people. TAS ratings were seamen with a non-substantive specialisation. Hence I would think it unlikely a TAS seaman with torpedo expertise would able to easily take over from a TAS seaman who had formerly been in the ASDIC branch as for instance a Higher Submarine Detector. Other seamen were radar operators, while all submarines carried a seaman with a gunnery specialisation, a Leading Hand if a 4' gun was carried, Able Seaman if not. The Coxswain (CPO) and Second Coxswain (PO) were again seamen with a specialisation and so it goes. Without knowing the non-substantive ratings of all the seaman ratings it is difficult to assess the expertise aspect of the crew mix, aboard and left ashore.
As already said lookouts and the OOW on the bridge always needed to keep a keen eye on their surroundings for all our sakes, yet at any given time we wouldn't know who was up there. The people in the fore ends and after ends had to work as a disciplined team to safely load the bulky and heavy torpedoes. Yet the cook worked alone as did the Officer's Steward, but if the boat had a gun the cook could be found passing shells up the gun hatch as part of that team. And so it went, a small community but we didn't get any team talks. What held them together was confidence that the Captain and the First Lieutenant more or less knew what they was doing, they didn't have to be a superman, just competent and in turn that we were all doing our varied jobs competently. Nelson said it all in his famous signal before Trafalgar, sent to ships manned by men and boys, even women, many not British, it gave clear message to all and still applies today. Do your individual duty whatever you may be on the ship. In my view that is what the Navy is all about, a sense of ones individual duty at any time in any circumstance. My point is that an individual who had significant submarine experience, quickly fitted into any crew. My transition from a more modern A boat to an older T Class was virtually seamless. And I would say much the same for the other RN submarines of the era, the smaller S Class.
However I would point out that some Amphion Class had Vickers engines and others Admiralty engines, of much the same basic design, but different in detail. I would not claim to know how long it took for an ERA to get used to one or the other. But in my experience training like this if required was done, to use a modern term, on the 'buddy' system, with the 'learner' going on watch with the 'teacher' for a period. But this was usually more applicable to people fresh out of submarine training. The engine room crew of the experimental Scotsman had no problem with the different Amphion Class engines as they temporarily took over different A Class for a night to recharge their submarine. See anecdote Lt (E) Phil Toms RN (ret). Chief ERA HM/SM Scotsman, 1954.
The book reports the Coxswain marching the crew down to the boat, well may be as it was but I was never marched anywhere, we just made our own way from the shore quarters at Dolphin and the messes on floating depot ships. The point was that different people had to report at different times depending on the work that had to done before sailing. Coxswains I remember were really not marching sort of fellows. Still if that is what people remember, who am I to debate the matter?
The comments about sleeping arrangements of the rates below PO needs clarifying, some slept in the actual stokers and seaman's messes on the cushions of the seats as bunks. Above were fold up tubular steel frame bunks with stretched canvas. Some slept in bunks just outside in the passage, others slept in the fore ends on fold up bunks again made up of tubular rames with stretched canvas. On a T Class 18 bunks were provided like this in the fore ends. They were hinged and swung up during the day if required for working. I can't recall the number in the fore ends of the A Class. I am 6 ft 4ins and always had enough length, but you did have to be young! Some people slept in the after ends but at sea when a little rough, this could be quite uncomfortable with the stern rising and falling with screws racing and the A brackets rattling, but I guess you could get used it as did the stokers on a T Class where all the stokers messed and slept in isolation aft, there were no aft internal torpedo tubes.
The Captain mustering the troops for a chat was something I never experienced, my experience was that the Jimmy (1st Lt) managed the boat in harbour through either the officers or senior NCOs. The Skipper was usually coming down the gang plank with the casing party waiting to pull it in to stow and the bridge crew in place and away we went. Same in reverse when we returned, skipper straight off to report to Captain S/M. You might see the skipper occasionally in harbour rounds once month and if you were in trouble being drunk ashore. He would occasionally come down for a drink in the ward room in the early evening, but really I doubt I spoke two words to Lt Cmdr Crawford (DSC and bar) in the year or more I served on Artemis. However in dodgy situations he would get on the Tannoy (public address) and tell us what was going on. I have no doubt he knew who I was, as he depended on me (and others) to run his motor room properly when he was asleep. It was just an aloof, lonely sort of job. One always knew what was going, somehow. I always peered at the chart as I passed through the control room on my way to go on watch. Later when I was a PO, the skipper during an attack might ask me for the state of the battery, but that was it.
The question raised about the Electrical Artificer being left ashore is a rather a delicate one to respond to having been many years ago, a PO Electrician in the then quite new Electrical Branch, but I must say nice fellows though they were and no doubt highly skilled in my experience were wasted on a submarine of that time. I served on four boats over a six year period and never worked in any technical way with the EA. His main duty was to stop and start the Sperry Gyro Compass before leaving harbour and on return stop it after the EA gyro expert from the depot ship came down the boat to check the compass. I was lectured on Gyro by an EA expert at the electrical school and he told me he hated the smell when he had to go down a boat just back in after a long trip. In theory we were expected to be able to start and set the gyro on any kind of ship ourselves, many small ships with Gyros did not have EAs. Fitting and turning skills were a major part of an EAs training and not so in the general Electrical Branch. But such skills if required could be performed by the ERAs on their la
Comments
Comment by: Paul Vincent on October 28, 2020
For the record Ray Vincent ch. 27 didn’t exist but Roy Vincent did. He was my uncle and had brother my Grandad so not an only child as referred to in the book. His parents were in their mid 40’s at this time so not elderly as referred to in the book. He joined to earn an extra 1/2 Crown as he was due to marry.
He knew full well the Affray wasn’t sea worthy as he told Grandad it leaked like a sieve and was not fit to sail and the lower ranks were all worried about the mission. This book causes a great deal of distress to Grandad due to these errors and it’s content.
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